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I. Introduction
The phenomenon of the unsolicited takeover bid or tender offer
has, undoubtedly, been the preeminent issue in U.S. corporate law
for almost a decade. While there has been no shortage of legal
scholarship dealing with the tender offer, the treatment of this phe-
nomenon in other countries has received infrequent attention by
American commentators. This is unfortunate because the British
regulatory system, in particular, has much to contribute to our back-
ground knowledge in many areas of tender offer regulation which
are of particular concern in the United States today. Specifically,
with respect to devices such as the two-tier tender offer, defensive
tactics by target management, and equality of treatment of all share-
holders, the British system has much to teach its U.S. counterpart.
This paper will compare the British, self-regulatory scheme of
takeover bids with several key elements of the U.S. regulatory sys-
tem. Following this comparison, the author will attempt to draw
some conclusions concerning the applicability of several significant
features of the British system to U.S. law in areas where the U.S.
regulatory scheme has received considerable criticism.
II. Philosophy of Regulation
The tender offer regulatory schemes of both Britain and the
United States purport to be intended primarily for the benefit of the
individual shareholder of the target corporation. More specifically,
both schemes are designed to ensure that it is the target's sharehold-
ers who ultimately determine whether or not the takeover bid suc-
ceeds and that such shareholders are able to make this decision while
in possession of all material facts relevant to the offer and in an at-
mosphere free of undue coercion and time pressure.
The British system articulates this concern in General Principle
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law; B.A. 1966, University of
Wisconsin; J.D. 1969, Harvard University.
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4 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which provides:'
Shareholders shall have in their possession sufficient evidence,
facts and opinions upon which an adequate judgment and decision
can be reached and shall have sufficient time to make an assessment
and decision. No relevant information shall be withheld from
them. 2
The Introduction as well as General Principles 1 and 7, among
other things, contain language which underscores this philosophy. 3
This is not to say that the motives behind the adoption of the
City Code were totally altruistic. There is much evidence indicating
that the London financial community (the City) adopted the City
Code and established the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers
largely to head off possible action by Parliament in the same area, the
impetus for which developed from a number of perceived abuses in
the 1950s and 1960s.4 Nonetheless, regardless of the motives un-
derlying its adoption, it is clear that the City Code functions to pro-
tect the interests of the target shareholder without preventing the
success of an offer which is favorable to most shareholders. In other
words, the City Code does not allow the target management to suc-
cessfully obstruct the hostile offer. 5
The motivation underlying the Williams Act, the City Code's
U.S. equivalent, is similar in some respects, yet different in others. 6
The legislative history surrounding passage of the Williams Act indi-
cates that Congress primarily intended to "close a significant gap in
investor protection under the federal securities laws by requiring the
disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons
seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer or
through open market or privately negotiated purchases of securi-
I City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Council in the Securities Industry 6th rev.
ed. 1987) [hereinafter City Code].
2 City Code, supra note I, General Principle 3.
3 The Introduction to the General Principles requires the board of directors of both
the offeror and offeree and their respective advisors to act in the best interests of their
respective shareholders. General Principle 7 prohibits the board of the offeree from tak-
ing any defensive action after a bona fide offer has been made (or is reasonably perceived
as being imminent) without the consent of the shareholders. This assures that all share-
holders will have an opportunity to decide the offer on its merits. General Principle I
requires that all shareholders of an offeree company be treated similarly by the offeror
company.
4 See Rider and Hew, The Regulation of Corporation and Securities Law in Britain - The
Beginning of the Real Debate, 19 MALAYA L. REV. 144, 156-57 (1977).
5 Cf. City Code, supra note 1, General Principle 7, Rule 21, discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 109-11.
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(f), 14(d)-(O), Act ofJuly 29, 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), as amended by Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.
Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 10, 89 Stat. 97, 119-21, as amended by Domestic and Foreign Invest-
ment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 202, 91 Stat. 1498, 1498-99
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(d)(f), 78 n(d)-(f) (1982)). These provisions are hereinafter
cited as "Williams Act." The section numbers referred to are those from the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
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ties."' 7 The legislative history of the Act also indicates that Congress
intended the Act to be evenhanded, i.e., not to tip the balance of
regulation either in favor of the target corporation or the offeror. 8
In so doing, it rejected suggestions from a number of interested par-
ties that the Act should be framed in a manner which would discour-
age tender offers on the grounds that they were not in the public
interest.9 While those favoring an evenhanded approach may have
appeared to carry the day when the Williams Act was passed, the Act,
when combined with various provisions of state corporate law al-
ready in existence and state takeover laws subsequently enacted, ap-
pears to give the target management more opportunities actively to
resist an unwanted takeover than exist in Britain. t0 Indeed, this goal
may have been one of the unstated motives underlying its passage, as
populist pressures in favor of preserving local ownership of long-
standing small and medium sized corporations of great significance
to a given community were apparent from the legislative debates sur-
rounding passage of the Act.
7 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Harrison Williams, sponsor of the
bill).
8 H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1967).
9 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1977).
10 The procedural safeguards included in the Williams Act, ostensibly for the protec-
tion of the target shareholder, effectively delay the time period needed to consummate an
offer. This gives the target corporation's management time to marshall any one of a
number of defensive tactics designed to defeat the unwanted offer. Under SEC Rule 14d-
7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1986), a person who has deposited securities pursuant to a
tender offer has the right to withdraw them at any time while the offer remains open. Also,
SEC Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1986), requires an offer to remain open for at
least twenty business days after any increase in the amount of the consideration has been
made by the bidder. Also, section 13(d)(1) of the Williams Act requires any person who
becomes the beneficial owner of more than five percent of any class of equity security to
file a disclosure statement with the issuing corporation, the SEC, and any stock exchange
on which such securities are traded. This must be done within ten days after such acquisi-
tion. This requirement effectively warns the potential target of a forthcoming hostile take-
over.
Many state anti-takeover laws formerly contained delaying provisions significantly
more stringent than the Williams Act. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v.
MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982), holding the Illinois Business Take-over Act unconstitutional,
it appeared that any state legislation containing provisions delaying a tender offer beyond
the time periods specified in the Williams Act would be unenforceable. However, in CTS
Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), the Court upheld Indiana's
"control share acquisition" law which allows the target corporation to delay the offeror's
right to vote any shares acquired for up to fifty days after the tender offer commenced.
Thus, the current status of state laws delaying a tender offer beyond Williams Act time
limits remains unsettled. The most significant impediment at the state level, however, re-
mains unscathed. That is the "business judgment rule," which gives a heavy presumption
of validity to decisions made by a target's board of directors, including engaging in defen-
sive tactics to ward off unwanted takeover bids. Although the propriety of a board's deci-
sion dealing with a takeover bid is occasionally challenged successfully (see, e.g., Smith v.
Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)), such cases are the exceptions that prove the rule.
See generally Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control: An Analogue to Determine the Validity of
Target Management Defensive Measures, 66 IOWA L. REv. 475 (1981).
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A second philosophical precept common to both countries' laws
is that of shareholder equality. Both systems of regulation seek to
accord all shareholders an equal opportunity to receive the premium
price being offered by the offeror. This concept is implemented by
the two countries in quite different ways, however. In Britain, first of
all, the City Code requires that any person or group of persons act-
ing in concert who acquire thirty percent of a company's securities
must offer to purchase all remaining outstanding shares at an
amount equal to the highest price that the offeror paid within the
past twelve months." Second, the City Code prohibits the offeror
from purchasing or selling stock during an offer or when one is in
contemplation on favorable terms which are not made available to all
shareholders, unless the Panel specifically consents thereto.12 Third,
the Code requires the Panel's consent for any partial bid and indi-
cates that consent will ordinarily be given if the partial bid' 3 is for
less than thirty percent of the shares carrying voting rights. 14 Con-
sent will not normally be given for partial bids exceeding thirty per-
cent, however, if the offeror has acquired significant numbers of
shares in the twelve months preceding the application for the bid.15
Fourth, the Code provides for proration of purchases from share-
holders during partial offers and prohibits open market purchases
during such offers. 16 Fifth, any offer for more than thirty percent of
the voting shares of a company, even if approved by the Panel, must
also be approved by the holders of shares carrying fifty percent of
the voting rights of a company. 17 The effect of these provisions is to
severely disfavor partial bids and to prevent an offeror from ob-
taining enough shares to gain working control of a company, unless
the holders of an absolute majority of the voting shares approve of
the acquisition.
The Williams Act approaches the problem of equal treatment in
a very different manner. The Act contains no limitations on the fun-
damental right of the offeror to make partial bids although it does
regulate the manner in which such bids can be made. First, the Act
requires the offeror to prorate acceptances from each shareholder
tendering within a specified time period if the offer is oversub-
scribed, in effect prohibiting a partial offer from being made on a
first-come first-served basis.' 8 This section is designed to prevent
the shareholders from being stampeded into hastily accepting an of-
I I City Code, supra note 1, Rule 9.1.
12 Id. Rule 16.
13' Id. Rule 36.1.
14 Id.
15 Id. Rule 36.2.
16 Id. Rules 36.7 and 36.3.
17 Id. Rule 36.5.
1H Williams Act, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) (1987).
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fer without giving it due consideration for fear of being left out en-
tirely. Second, the Act contains a "most favored shareholder"
provision requiring that any increase in the price made during an
offer must be given to those shareholders who have previously ten-
dered their shares. 19 Third, the Act requires an offer to be kept
open for a minimum period of twenty business days. This ensures
that all shareholders will have an adequate opportunity to consider
the terms of the offer and to avoid the advantage which professional
arbitrageurs and other large shareholders may have in scrutinizing
an offer more quickly. 20 Finally, a shareholder is given the right to
withdraw shares tendered at any time while the offer remains open. 2'
The Williams Act has been criticized for allowing partial offers
which open the door to the making of "two-tier offers" in which an
initial offer at a high price is followed by a subsequent offer for the
remainder of the shares on much less attractive terms, either for a
lower cash price or for low grade "junk bonds." On the other hand,
while the City Code's discouragement of partial bids avoids this
problem, it does so at the cost of discouraging many offers alto-
gether by effectively increasing the cost of the offer since the offeror
must tender for all of a company's voting stock.
A third common philosophical precept is that both regulatory
schemes are primarily disclosure oriented, i.e., they reflect the phi-
losophy that the regulatory authority should have as its primary goal
to ensure that the target shareholders are given access to all facts
necessary for an informed decision on the merits of the offer, and
that it is not for the regulators to pass on the substantive merits of
the offer. General Principle 422 sets forth the basic goal that share-
holders should be given all relevant information necessary to reach
an informed decision on the merits of the offer.2 3 More specifically,
the Board of the target company is required to publicize an offer
immediately upon receipt.2 4 It is also required to send promptly a
copy of its press statement summarizing the terms of the offer to its
shareholders. 2 5 Furthermore, the offeror is required to provide to
the offeree shareholders a great deal of specific information under
Rules 23 through 28 concerning the identity of the offeror and its
officers and directors, its plans for the future, financing arrange-
ments, and other information of interest to the shareholders. 2 6
") Id., § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
20 SEC Rule 14d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(a) (1986).
21 SEC Rule 14d-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1986), extends the statutory seven-
day withdrawal right of shareholders to allow withdrawal during the entire period the offer
remains open.
22 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
23 City Code, supra note 1, General Principle 4.
24 Id. Rule 2.2(a).
25 Id. Rule 6.
2(6 Rule 23.2 states the general concept that "shareholders must be given sufficient
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The Williams Act also contains detailed disclosure require-
ments. Section 14d-3 requires the filing of a "tender offer state-
ment" by the offeror in any offer for more than five percent of any
class of equity securities of a subject corporation.2 7 The information
to be disclosed is detailed in section 14d-6 and is continued on
schedule 14D- 1.28 In short, the disclosure provisions of the Williams
Act generally parallel those of the City Code; both have as their gen-
eral goal the disclosure of all information which might reasonably be
expected to be material to an investor in deciding whether to tender
his shares.
III. Coverage Compared: What Is A "Tender Offer"?
The Williams Act, with one exception, only applies to a transac-
tion which is deemed to be a "tender offer," a term which is not
defined in the Act itself.2 9 The exception is that anyone who ac-
quires over five percent of any class of equity securities of a company
subject to the Act is required to file a disclosure statement with the
SEC and the target regardless of whether the acquisition is by way of
tender offer or otherwise.3 0 The other provisions of the Act, includ-
ing the anti-fraud provisions of section 14(e) and the various provi-
sions designed to ensure equal treatment of shareholders and an
adequate opportunity to consider the bid before tendering, apply
only to a "tender offer." '3' The legislative history of the Act indicates
that the term was purposely left undefined, largely due to congres-
sional concern that a rigid definition might allow parties to structure
information and advice to enable them to reach a properly informed decision as to the
merits or demerits of an offer .. " The more significant provisions implementing this
general objective are as follows. Rule 24.1 requires the offeror to state its general inten-
tions concerning the plans which it has for the offeree company. Rule 25.1 requires the
board of the offeree company to circulate to the shareholders its views on the offer and to
make known the substance of the advice given to it by the independent advisors which it is
required to appoint under Rule 3.1. In addition, the Rules require the disclosure of a
considerable amount of financial information relating to both the offeror and offeree (Rule
24.2); shareholdings in the offeree company (Rule 24.3) by the offeror and by interested
directors, special arrangements between the offeror and any directors or major sharehold-
ers of the offeree (Rule 24.5); and shareholdings in the offeror company by the offeree
(Rule 25.3).
27 SEC Rules 14d-3, 6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-3, 6 (1986).
28 Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.100 (1986), requires the disclosure of (1) the
name of the subject company and the number and class of securities being tendered for;
(2) identity and background of the offeror; (3) statement of past contacts, transactions, or
negotiations between offeror and offeree; (4) source and amount of funds to be utilized for
the purchase; (5) purpose of the offer and plans or proposals of the bidder; (6) present
holdings of the offeree's securities by the offeror; (7) any contracts, understandings, or
arrangements concerning the securities to be acquired; (8) persons retained or employed
on the offeror's behalf to solicit securities; (9) financial statements of the offeror; and (10)
any contracts with the offeree's officers or board, any known antitrust problems or margin
regulation problems, or other material legal proceedings or problems.
29 Williams Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982).
30 Id.
31 See text at note 10 supra.
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transactions in a manner which would fall outside the scope of the
definition while being within the purpose of the Act. 32 The SEC in
1979 issued proposed regulations defining "tender offer" but these
regulations have never been adopted. 33
The experience with judicial interpretations of the term "tender
offer" has been mixed. In a number of cases, the courts have found a
transaction to constitute a tender offer although it was lacking in one
or more of the attributes of a traditional tender offer. Thus, in Cattle-
men's Investment Co. v. Fears34 and Wellman v. Dickson,35 the courts
found the Williams Act to be applicable where there was direct one-
on-one solicitation of several holders of large blocks of stock but no
general solicitation of the public. In most of the cases, the courts
have applied a functional approach, asking whether in the particular
transaction in question the shareholders have need for the protec-
tions provided by the Williams Act. In doing so, the courts seem to
have focused more on the disclosure and anti-fraud purposes of the
Act, as well as the need for shareholders to act without undue time
pressure. The courts have paid less attention, however, to the objec-
tive of equal treatment of shareholders and the opportunity of all
shareholders to share in a control premium. Thus, in a number of
cases, purchases of a large block of stock have been held not to fall
within the Williams Act although they may have had the effect of giv-
ing the offeror working control of the target company. 36
32 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
33 SEC Release No. 34-16,385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,358 (Dec. 6, 1979).
34 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972). In that case, defendant purchased a total of
twelve percent of the target's stock after soliciting several shareholders both in person and
by telephone in what the court deemed "an active and widespread" campaign. Id. at 1251.
The court concluded that the transaction was a "tender offer" because it had the effect of
forcing shareholders "into making a hurried investment decision without access to infor-
mation in circumvention of the statutory purpose." Id. at 1252.
35 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1069 (1983). In Wellman, defendants had acquired thirty-four percent of the tar-
get's stock through purchases from thirty-three individual and institutional shareholders
through individual telephone solicitations. The court concluded that the transaction more
closely resembled a public tender offer than a privately negotiated purchase and in so
doing enumerated eight factors which have been widely cited in making the determination
of whether a transaction should be deemed a "tender offer." These are: (1) active and
widespread solicitation of public shareholders in the shares of an issuer; (2) solicitation
made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a
premium over the prevailing price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
(5) offer contingent on the tender of a fihed number of shares, often subject to a fixed
maximum number to be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree
subjected to pressure to sell his stock; (8) public announcements of purchasing program
concerning target company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts of
the target company's securities. Id. at 823-24.
36 Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985). In a case where the
offeror completed substantial open market purchases of stock immediately following the
announcement that it had terminated its tender offer, the court concluded that these open
market purchases did not constitute a "tender offer," primarily relying on the fact that
most of the shares purchased had been held by sophisticated investors, such as arbi-
trageurs, who did not need the protections of the Williams Act. Id. at 57-58. With the
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The City Code, in contrast, contains a specific definition of the
transactions to which it applies.3 7 Furthermore, it explicitly gives the
City Panel discretion to apply the Code to all transactions within its
spirit. The Introduction to the General Principles candidly recog-
nizes that "[i]t is impracticable to devise rules in sufficient detail to
cover all the various circumstances which arise in take-over or
merger transactions. Accordingly, persons engaged in such transac-
tions should be aware that the spirit as well as the precise wording of
the General Principles and the ensuing Rules must be observed.
Moreover, it must be accepted that the General Principles and the
Spirit of the Code will apply in areas or circumstances not explicitly
covered by any Rule. '5 8 Also, the term "offer" is defined as includ-
ing, "wherever appropriate, take-over and merger transactions how-
soever effected .... ."39 Thus, the City Panel appears to have a
sweeping mandate to apply the Code at its sole discretion and with-
out the restraint ofjudicial review since it is a self-regulatory organi-
zation. 40 The SEC is, of course, given a much more limited mandate
under the Williams Act, and according to normal principles of U.S.
administrative law, its actions are always subject to judicial review. 41
The few occasions where the Commission has attempted to expand
its regulatory mandate beyond the bounds of the Williams Act have
met with spirited criticism from both within and without the
Commission. 42
In addition to giving the Panel a plenary mandate to interpret
the Code functionally, the City Code also contains rules designed to
regulate specific types of transactions. Thus, the Panel's consent is
exception of the "special bid" discussed below, the courts have not generally held that
transactions executed on a securities exchange constituted "tender offers."
37 "The Code is concerned with take-over and merger transactions, partial offers,
offers by a parent company for shares in its subsidiary and certain other transactions where
control of a company (as defined) is to be obtained or consolidated. References in the
Code to 'take-overs' include, where appropriate, all such transactions. The Code does not
apply to offers for non-voting, non-equity capital." City Code, supra note 1, at A4.
38 Demott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons foni the British, 58 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 945, 974-78 (1983).
39 City Code, supra note 1, at B5, C I.
40 However, a recent decision did hold that the Panel's decisions are subject to judi-
cial review, whether it is acting as a rule-maker, interpreter of the Code, or as a disciplinary
body. The court also stated that the Panel clearly should be given a great deal of discre-
tion and thus its decisions should be overturned only rarely. R. v. The Panel on Take-ovcrs
and Mergers, [1987] 2 W.L.R. 699 (C.A.).
41 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-52 (1986).
42 For example, in SEC Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1986), the Commission
extended the minimum proration period for shares deposited pursuant to a tender offer
from ten calendar to twenty business days. Section 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provided for the ten day period but, by a three-two vote, the Commission felt
that it was empowered under its rule-making authority to expand this period legislatively,
despite a spirited dissent from Chairman Shad who felt that this action exceeded the SEC's
statutory rule-making authority. Pro rata Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 19,336, [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,306 (Dec. 15, 1982).
396 [VOL. 12
REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
required for any partial offer. 43 A partial offer for more than thirty
percent of the voting rights of a company is specifically disfavored. 44
Where it is allowed, it is subject to certain restrictions set forth in
Rule 36.4 5 Thus, the Code places more emphasis on regulation on a
transactional basis than does the Williams Act and is more specific in
the types of protections which it provides for shareholders against
specified potential abuses. Because a partial offer which gives the
offeror a controlling interest may be especially prejudicial to remain-
ing minority shareholders, the Code deals specifically with this prob-
lem, but confines its treatment to those cases. In contrast, the
Williams Act requirement of proration of share purchases applies
across the board to any partial offer, and not merely to one which
confers a controlling interest on the offeror.46
Although the Panel appears to have plenary authority to regu-
late any transaction within the spirit of the Code, it has been curi-
ously hesitant to use its authority to regulate novel transactions
where it feels that asserting its jurisdiction without advance warning
might constitute unfair surprise to the participants. An example of
this is the phenomenon of the "dawn raid" which appeared in the
late 1970s.4 7 In a dawn raid, one company, acting through its bro-
kers, places an order for a large block of shares to be executed on the
stock exchange on the opening of trading for a short period of time,
at a price significantly above the last quotation. These transactions
were complained of as being unfair to small investors who were often
unaware that such an offer had been made until after it had ex-
pired. 48 Typically, only large investors and other favored customers
of brokers received notice of it before its time limit expired due to
the short time period in which it took place and the impossibility of
the broker individually notifying all of his small individual custom-
ers. Because the percentage of shares acquired was typically less
than the thirty percent needed to trigger Rules 27 and 34, it was not
explicitly subject to substantive regulation under the City Code,
although arguably it was within its spirit. In 1980 the Council for the
Securities Industry responded by issuing its Rules Governing Substan-
43 City Code, supra note 1, Rule 36.1.
44 See City Code, supra note 1, Rule 36.4, which requires that an offer for between
thirty and fifty percent of the voting rights of a company must state the precise number of
shares sought, and provides that the offer may not be declared unconditional unless ac-
ceptances are received for not less than such number. Also, Rule 36.5 requires that an
offer which could result in the offeror holding thirty percent or more of the voting rights
of a company cannot be declared unconditional unless approved by shareholders holding
over fifty percent of the voting rights not held by the offeror.
45 See text infra at notes 81 to 91.
46 SEC Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1986).
47 See, e.g., Raiders at 9:30, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1980, at 13-14.
48 The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March, 1980,
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tial Acquisitions of Shares.49 These Rules effectively require that such
dawn raids either be accomplished through a partial offer subject to
the requirements of the City Code or, if the shares are purchased on
the Stock Exchange, the transaction must be announced publicly at
least seven days prior to the close of the offer. 50 The Rules Governing
Substantial Acquisitions of Shares effectively ended the abuses associated
with dawn raids. It is revealing to note, however, that action by the
City Panel on an ad hoc basis was notably absent in the interval be-
tween the commencement of such raids in the later 1970s and the
adoption of formal rules to deal with them. This reticence suggests
that the Panel has been rather conservative in interpreting its broad
mandate under the Code and prefers to operate on a rule-making
basis in policing new types of transactions. In short, the broad man-
date given the Panel to enforce the spirit of the Code, which should
be one of the main advantages of a self-regulatory scheme, has not
been exercised as effectively as it might have.
The U.S. history of regulating the "special bid" is similar. A
special bid is an offer placed on a securities exchange to purchase a
block of shares at a specified price, typically at a substantial premium
to the market, for a limited period of time.5 1 The SEC has taken the
position that such purchases constitute a "tender offer" under the
Williams Act and become subject, among other things, to its with-
drawal and proration requirements. 5 2 These regulations have, for all
practical purposes, eliminated the use of the special bid as a substi-
tute for a tender offer since it is practically impossible to comply with
the withdrawal and proration requirements in transactions executed
on a securities exchange.
In concluding this Section, it appears at first blush that the
Panel's broad mandate to regulate in accordance with the spirit
rather than the letter of the City Code would result in the Panel
being more readily able to deal with novel situations as they occur.
In practice, however, there seems to be something of a regulatory lag
in both Britain and America in dealing with novel types of takeover
bids which were not contemplated at the inception of the regula-
tions. While the actions of the City Panel are not, strictly speaking,
limited by any doctrine of due process, there has been an under-
standable tendency on the part of the Panel to adopt a "hands off"
policy with respect to new types of activity, at least until the instiga-
4o Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares Council for the Securities In-
dustry (Council for the Securities Industry 1981), reprinted in 2 C. SCHMIrHOFF, M. KAY &
G. MORSE, PALMER'S COMPANY LAW C-993 to -1029 (22d ed. 1976) [hereinafter Rules Gov-
erning Substantial Acquisitions].
50 Id. Rule 2.
51 E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 71 (1973).
52 See SEC Release No. 8392, 33 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (Aug. 30, 1968).
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tor has had fair warning that its activity may be subject to the juris-
diction of the Panel.
IV. Differences in Nature of Regulation
A. Procedural differences
The differences between proceedings brought before the City
Panel on the one hand and the SEC on the other are substantial, and
they'illustrate, more vividly than in any other area, the difference be-
tween a self-regulatory scheme and one with legal authority.
In the United States, proceedings before the SEC are subject, as
with any administrative agency, to the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act. 53 Thus, a party involved with the SEC is entitled to formal
legal representation by counsel.54 Formal rules of evidence are fol-
lowed, and counsel may cross-examine witnesses and make opening
and closing statements.5 5 Any transcripts made or opinions issued
are matters of public record. 56 With regard to rule-making proceed-
ings, each rule must first be published as a notice of proposed rule-
making with those affected being given a reasonable period of time
to file statements with the Commission either opposing or favoring
the rule. 5 7 Any rule issued may be challenged by a person adversely
affected on the grounds, among other things, that it exceeds the
Commission's statutory authority or is unconstitutional.5 8
Proceedings brought before the Panel are quite different. Hear-
ings are normally held in camera.59 Although parties are entitled to
bring attorneys or other counselors with them, no formal legal repre-
sentation is allowed unless specifically permitted by the Panel, which
is an infrequent occurrence. Thus, counsel may not act as an advo-
cate for his client, cross-examine witnesses, or make formal state-
ments on his behalf. This lack of full right to counsel has been
criticized by some as denying due process of law to a party under
investigation. The Panel's response has been that it tends to keep
proceedings informal and flexible as well as save time.60 Also, it is
said less convincingly that because members of the Panel themselves
are experts in the securities industry they do not need the expertise
of counsel to assist them in defining and resolving the issues.6' Fi-
nally, the Panel points out that in cases, such as disciplinary proceed-
53 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
54 Id. § 555(b).
55 Id. § 554(c).
56 Id. § 552(b).
57 Id. § 553.
58 Id. §§ 701-06.
59 A. JOHNSON, THE CiTY TAKEOVER CODE 130 (1980).
60 Id. at 132-33.
6I Interview with Peter H. Lee, Deputy Director of the City Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers (Nov. 29, 1983).
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ings, where full legal representation does appear appropriate, it has
permitted counsel to act as an advocate for his client.6 2 With respect
to rule-making, since the Panel's rules do not have the force of law it
is entirely free to consider and adopt new rules and amendments or
clarifications to existing ones with no notice whatsoever to interested
parties.
The lack of legal constraints are often cited as one of the major
advantages of the British self-regulatory scheme in that they contrib-
ute to its speed, flexibility, and low cost. 63 This advantage may be
more apparent than real, however. Although there are, obviously,
criticisms being made of the existing scheme of takeover regulation
in the United States, lack of flexibility and speed are not among
those commonly voiced. 64 Concerning speed, the SEC possesses in-
dependent rule-making authority which does not require the ap-
proval of Congress for each specific edict it may issue.65 Thus, the
administrative process is more expeditious in the United States than
in Britain. As for flexibility, although the Panel is theoretically au-
thorized to deal with novel situations not covered by a particular rule
and is not subject to due process constraints in doing so, in practice
it has not moved as boldly as it could have. Although the City Code
expressly states that conduct within the spirit of the Code is subject
to action by the City Panel even if not within a specific regulation, 66
in fact the Panel has been sensitive to concerns of due process and
fair warning and has been hesitant to deal with novel situations on an
ad hoc basis.67 As the DeBeers case indicates, the Panel tends to toler-
ate novel actions which may violate the spirit of the Code and has
only moved after the fact to adopt new rules to deal with such activi-
ties in the future.68 Finally, the lesser role which attorneys play in
takeover regulation in Britain is consistent with the fact that attor-
62 Id.
63 See L. GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A DIscussION DOCUMENT 53
(1982) [hereinafter GOWER].
64 The SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, whose members included repre-
sentatives from all major constituencies affected by the takeover process, voiced no con-
cerns over the expeditiousness with which the SEC handles tender offer proceedings.
Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report on
Recommendations 34-46 (1983) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report].
65 Williams Act §§ 13(d)(1), 13(e)(l), 14(d)(l), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(l),
m(d)(l), n(d)(l), n(e) (1982).
66 The introduction to the City Code, supra note 1, provides in part, that "persons
engaged in such transactions should be aware that the spirit as well as the precise wording
of these General Principles and of the ensuing Rules must be observed ......
67 See Rider and Hew, supra note 4, at 168-7 1.
68 The acquisition by DeBeers Corp. of some thirteen million shares of Consolidated
Goldfields, Inc., in February 1980 was one of the largest "dawn raids." It and other trans-
actions of a similar nature were strongly criticized on the grounds that they distorted the
workings of the market and resulted in unequal treatment of shareholders. However, the
Stock Exchange and the other self-regulatory bodies, including the Council for the Securi-
ties Industry and the City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers were reluctant to interfere
with what were essentially open market transactions without any more specific authority.
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neys do not play as significant a role in the securities industry in Brit-
ain as they do in the United States. Clearly, however, such
limitations would be unacceptable in the United States where the bar
is closely intertwined with the securities industry. Moreover, unless
the United States adopted a self-regulatory scheme, any legal con-
straints on attorney participation would almost certainly be
unconstitutional.
In short, while the procedural differences mentioned above are
significant in illustrating how the mechanics of a self-regulatory
scheme differ from one with a legal framework, pointing out these
differences is not done with a view toward using the procedure of
either system as a model for reform of the other. Structural differ-
ences between the British and U.S. schemes of regulation reveal ba-
sic conceptual variances between the two systems, and indicate that a
marriage of the two would result in a mode of regulation hamstrung
by conflicting priorities and methods. Study of differing British and
U.S. procedures for governing tender offers, therefore, can do little
to suggest eligible reforms of the U.S. rules.
B. Substantive regulation of terms of offer
Both systems of regulation have as their primary goal the plac-
ing of ultimate decision making authority in the hands of the target
shareholders. The means by which this goal is implemented, how-
ever, are considerably different. While the City Code contains much
more severe limitations on the substantive nature and content of the
takeover bid, the Williams Act is primarily a disclosure and anti-
fraud statute.6 9 The main substantive limitations which the Act
places on the content of the offer consist of time limitations on the
length of the offer, 70 the requirement that purchases of oversub-
Thus, no action was taken until the Council for the Securities Industry formally adopted
the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares in 1981.
69 Under section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982), persons who
acquire five percent or more of any class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must disclose that holding in a report filed with the SEC
within ten days of the acquisition. This disclosure should contain certain specified infor-
mation, including the backgrounds and identities of persons making the acquisition, the
source of funds for making the acquisition, information concerning contracts which the
acquiring person may have with respect to any securities of the issuer, and the purpose of
acquiring the shares. If that purpose is to obtain control of the target, any plans which the
person may have to make major changes in the target should also be disclosed. This dis-
closure statement must be filed with the SEC regardless of whether or not a tender offer is
contemplated. If a tender offer is made, section 14(d)(3) of the Act requires that a
"Tender Offer Statement" must be filed with the SEC and disseminated to each share-
holder containing certain information specified in section 14(d)(6) of the Act. Section
14(e) of the Williams Act contains a broad anti-fraud provision prohibiting the employ-
ment of fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with a tender offer.
70 A tender offer must remain open for a minimum of twenty business days from the
date it is first published or sent to shareholders. SEC Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.e-
1 (a) (1986).
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scribed partial offers must be prorated among all tendering share-
holders 71 and, third, the requirement that all shareholders tendering
must be extended a higher price if the offeror raises the price during
the course of the offer. 72 Subject to these limitations, though, the
Williams Act permits the offeror to make an offer for all or as many
of a company's shares as it wishes at whatever price it deems
desirable.
The City Code, on the other hand, circumscribes the offeror's
freedom of action much more severely. Under the Code any offer
for fifteen percent or more of any class of stock must be made at a
price equal to or higher than the highest price which the offeror paid
for any other shares purchased during the preceding twelve
months. 73 Second, partial offers are permitted only with the Panel's
consent and then only on severely restricted terms. 74 Third, the
Code effectively requires that any offeror obtaining thirty percent or
more of any class of shares must make an offer to purchase all re-
maining shares of the target. 75 Fourth, an offeror purchasing shares
controlling at least fifty percent of the equity voting rights of the cor-
poration is required to purchase shares constituting at least fifty per-
cent of the equity share capital of the company. 76 Fifth, the Code
contains rigid minimum and maximum time limitations governing an
offer comparable to those in the Williams Act. 7 7 Finally, the Code
requires that the offer be disclosed privately to the target's Board of
Directors prior to public announcement of the offer;78 moreover, the
offer may not be withdrawn without the consent of the Panel. 79 In
one respect, however, the City Code circumscribes the options of the
target shareholder more severely than does the Williams Act. Once
a shareholder has tendered, he may not withdraw his shares until the
expiration of twenty-one days from the first closing date of the initial
offer. 80 Since the offer itself must be kept open for a minimum pe-
riod of twenty-one days under Rule 3 1.1, a shareholder may not have
the right to withdraw his shares for as long as forty-two days. This
provision discourages competitive bidding, on the one hand, and,
on the other, encourages shareholders to hold onto their shares until
71 Williams Act, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
72 Williams Act, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
73 City Code, supra note 1, Rule 11.1.
74 Id. Rule 36.
75 Id. Rule 9.
76 Id. Rule 10.
77 Rule 31.1 requires that an offer must be kept open for at least twenty-one days
after its posting. Rule 32.1 requires a revised offer to remain open for at least fourteen
days after the date of posting notice of revision to shareholders. Rule 31.6 provides that
an offer normally must not be declared unconditional after the expiration of more than
sixty days from its commencement, unless the Panel's permission has been obtained.
78 Id. Rule 1.
79 Id. Rule 2.7.
80 Id. Rule 34.
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the first offer has almost expired in order to retain the freedom to
tender under a higher competing offer should one be made.
C. Treatment of partial offers
The issue of the fairness of "two-tier" bids in which an initial
tender offer for a portion of the target's shares is followed by a sec-
ond offer, usually at a lower price and often not involving cash, has
become a major concern in U.S. securities regulation. 8' Because the
City Code has dealt with this problem in some depth, a further exam-
ination of its treatment is useful in considering possible changes in
the Williams Act to deal with the same matter. The Williams Act
contains no provisions discouraging partial offers and grants the of-
feror complete freedom of action to determine the number of shares
which it wishes to seek, subject only to the duty to prorate purchases
among all shareholders in the event the offer is oversubscribed. 8 2
The City Code, as discussed above, contains provisions which se-
verely limit the making of partial offers. Most importantly, the
Panel's consent is required for any partial offer.8 3 Such consent nor-
mally has been granted for offers to purchase less than thirty percent
of the target's shares. Consent has not ordinarily been granted for a
partial bid for thirty percent or more of the offeree's shares, how-
ever, if the offeror has acquired significant numbers of shares of the
target during the preceding twelve months.8 4 In situations where
the partial offer is allowed by the Panel, it will usually be subject to
significant restrictions. First, it must be made to all shareholders and
purchases must be prorated among them if the offer is oversub-
scribed.8 5 Second, open market purchases are prohibited during the
offer and during the twelve month period following successful com-
pletion of the offer. 86 Third, if the offer is made for thirty to fifty
percent of the target's shares, the precise number of shares sought
must be stated and the offer must not be declared unconditional un-
less at least that many shares are tendered.8 7 Fourth, such a partial
offer requires that shareholders holding at least fifty percent of the
voting rights not held by the offeror must consent to the making of
the offer. This requirement may be waived by the Panel, however, if
one shareholder holds more than fifty percent of such voting
rights.88 Fifth, in cases where an offer for thirty percent or more of a
81 See, e.g., Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297, 304-06 (1974); Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellants,
and Takeout Mergers: the Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341.
82 Williams Act, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
83 City Code, supra note 1, Rule 36.1.
84 Id. Rule 36.2.
85 Id. Rule 36.7.
86 Id. Rule 36.3.
87 Id. Rule 36.4.
88 Id. Rule 36.5.
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company in which more than one class of equity shares exists, a com-
parable offer must be made for each class.8 9 Sixth, if the offer could
result in one offeror holding more than forty-eight percent of the
voting rights of the target, the offer document must contain a warn-
ing statement indicating that fact. Also, the offer document must dis-
close that the offeror will be free to acquire further shares without
being subject to the mandatory offer obligations of Rule 9 of the City
Code.90 Closely allied in purpose is the mandatory bid requirement
of Rule 9. Unless the Panel otherwise consents, this rule requires
that any person owning shares representing thirty percent or more
of the voting rights of a company, or any person or group who holds
between thirty and fifty percent of the voting rights of a company
and within a twelve month period acquires an additional two percent
of the voting rights, must make an offer to all equity shareholders to
purchase all remaining shares of the company at a price at least equal
to the highest price which he paid for any shares during the preced-
ing twelve months.9' Significantly, this requirement has no
equivalent in the Williams Act.
In effect, the City Code deals with the potential problems arising
from partial offers, such as the resulting unfair treatment of minority
shareholders, by strongly discouraging these offers. These restric-
tions were adopted as a response to the perceived unfairness to mi-
nority shareholders of partial bids, where severely plunging share
prices followed completion of the bid, leaving these shareholders
holding the bag. The absence of significant protection available to
minority shareholders under British company law exacerbated the
problem.9 2 Although the Williams Act does not deal specifically with
this problem, existing American case law dealing with the subject of
freezeouts does provide, at least in some jurisdictions, some measure
of protection to the minority shareholder.9 3 However, because par-
89 Id. Rule 36.8.
90 Id. Rule 36.6.
91 Id. Rule 9.1.
92 Minority shareholders' remedies in the United Kingdom have been of much less
importance than in the United States, primarily because of the doctrine established in Foss
v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843), which placed severe restrictions on
the situations in which shareholder derivative suits may be maintained. Furthermore, the
fact that contingent fees are prohibited and that the losing party may be required to pay
the winner's legal fees have discouraged plaintiffs' attorneys from bringing derivative suits.
There has been some improvement in the minority shareholders' position in the past dec-
ade, however. See L. GOWER, J. CRONIN, A. EASSON & LORD WEDDERBURN, GOWER'S PRIN-
CIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 644-70 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter GOWER'S PRINCIPLES];
Hannigan, Statutoiy Protection for AMinority Shareholders: Section 75 of the Companies Act 1980, 11
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 20 (1982).
.)7 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983);Jones v. H.F. Ahman-
son & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Brudney, Equal Treatment
of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072 (1983);
Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholders Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189
(1964).
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tial offers need not be cleared in advance by the SEC, such protec-
tions necessarily come in an ex post facto manner and then only if
the minority shareholder possesses significant motivation and re-
sources to institute litigation against the controlling shareholders or
the directors of the target.94 Nonetheless, the British approach is
not without cost since it may discourage partial offers, which are eco-
nomically advantageous for both minority shareholders and society
at large.
Mindful of this cost, the United States Congress enacted com-
paratively minor restrictions on the making of partial bids. The SEC
Advisory Committee on Tender Offers carefully considered whether
special provisions for partial offers should be included in the Wil-
liams Act. 9 5 In the end, the Committee recommended only the rela-
tively modest reform of requiring that partial offers should remain
open for two weeks longer than full bids, in order to provide share-
holders with the opportunity to carefully examine the implications of
such partial bids.96 In so doing the Committee was concerned lest it
discourage partial bids which may have any or all of the following
advantages: Allowing companies to invest in one or more industries
while limiting their financial exposure; facilitating technology ex-
change relationships; permitting change of control and reducing
management entrenchment in large companies; facilitating private
venture capital investment; encouraging foreign investment in U.S.
companies and allowing acquirors to get to know a potential ac-
quiree gradually with a view toward eventual total ownership.97
Thus, it appears likely that something close to the status quo will
be maintained in the United States with respect to partial bids. Per-
haps it is significant that, if anything, the British position has become
more receptive to partial bids over the years, thus implicitly recog-
nizing their potential benefits.
V. Defensive Tactics by Management
In no area of tender offer regulation are differences between the
two countries' approaches more striking than in that of limitations
on management conduct during the offer. In several respects, the
City Code clearly evinces a philosophy that management of the tar-
get should act in a manner primarily designed to assist the share-
holders in making the decision as to whether or not to tender to the
94 This is not always true, since the plaintiff may seek a preliminary injunction barring
consummation of the transaction complained of. Because of the need to prove that the
plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury, however, the request for the injunction may not be
granted even if the plaintiff proves that he is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits.
95 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 64, at 23-26.
96 Id. at 26, Recommendation 16.
97 Id. at 25.
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offeror. 9 8 In the United States, however, the regulatory treatment
seems somewhat dualistic, reflecting both the desirability of manage-
ment's taking an active role in the decision making process, and the
City Code's philosophy of shareholder sovereignty. 9 9
Both countries' regulatory treatment gives management a free
hand, prior to the announcement of a tender offer, subject only to
those normal regulatory constraints governing management conduct
in general. In both situations, management is free to engage in con-
duct designed to minimize the possibility of an unfriendly bid. This
behavior may range the gambit from nonobstructive tactics such as
improving management-shareholder relations by following a liberal
dividend policy or increasing communication with the shareholders,
to more active measures such as "shark-repellant" amendments,
mergers with other companies likely to raise antitrust issues with po-
tential offerors, reincorporating in states with corporate codes which
are more management-oriented, and changes in the corporation's fi-
nancial structure designed to diminish its attractiveness as a take-
over target. 100
Once an offer has been made or is reasonably perceived to be
imminent, however, the treatment of the two schemes diverges dra-
matically. The announcement of an offer triggers several duties
upon management of the target in Britain. First, once management
receives notice of "any firm intention to make an offer" it must publi-
cize it by press notice without delay.' 0 ' The offeror must also make a
statement announcing the offer without undue delay.10 2 Second, the
target must promptly send a copy of the press notice or other circu-
lar to its shareholders. 0 3 Third, the target must obtain competent
independent legal advice on any offer and must communicate this to
its shareholders. 10 4 Fourth, any information given by management
to a preferred offeror must also be furnished, on request, to any
other "less welcome but bona fide offeror or potential offeror."'10 5
Fifth, management must take a position on the offer and must
promptly notify its shareholders whether it favors or opposes the of-
8 See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
100 The literature cataloguing the vast array of defensive tactics which may be em-
ployed is extensive. See, e.g., E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS]; M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS (1978); A. FLEISCHER,
TENDER OFFERS, DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING (1979).
101 City Code, supra note 1, Rule 2.3. The Code also provides, however, that the tar-
get's board "is entitled to be satisfied that the offeror is or will be in a position to imple-
ment the offer in full." Id. Rule l(c).
102 Id. Rule 2.2.
1o)3 Id. Rule 2.6.
104 Id. Rule 3.1.
105 Id. Rule 19.4.
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fer or whether it is neutral. 106
The only comparable affirmative duty imposed on the target
management in the United States is the requirement that manage-
ment take a position whether for, against, or neutral, and advise its
shareholders of this fact.' 0 7 No provisions comparable to the other
requirements of the City Code exist. Thus, target management has
much more freedom of action in deciding how to respond to an un-
welcome offer in the United States. Rather than placing a duty to
assist the target shareholders upon management, as does the City
Code, the U.S. regulatory scheme essentially places both manage-
ment of the target and the offeror at arms length from the sharehold-
ers and offers them an equal opportunity to wage war for the target
shareholders' favors.
It is with respect to post-offer defensive tactics, however, that
the most significant differences of all appear. The City Code prohib-
its management from engaging in any obstructive defensive tactics
which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated
or in the shareholders of the offeree being denied the right to decide
on the success of the offer on its merits.' 0 8 This concept is so funda-
mental that it is stated as a General Principle of the Code as well as
being more specifically codified in the Rules. While the target man-
agement may seek out a white knight to make a competing bid it
must, on request, make available all information which it provides to
such a favored suitor to an unwelcome suitor as well.' 0 9 Further-
more, it must not take any substantive action that interferes with the
right of the shareholders to decide which of the competing bids
should be accepted. 1 0
In striking contrast, the management of an American corpora-
tion is free to engage in any number of defensive tactics designed to
ward off an unwelcome takeover, limited only by the doctrine known
as the business judgment rule. This doctrine generally gives action
of corporate management a heavy presumption of validity absent a
showing of fraud or conflict of interest."' Such tactics today com-
monly include instituting litigation challenging the validity of the of-
106 Id. Rule 25.1.
107 SEC Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 40.14e-2 (1986), requires that, within ten business
days from the date a tender offer is first made, the target company shall publish or send to
its shareholders a statement either recommending acceptance or rejection of the offer,
expressing no opinion and remaining neutral towards the offer, or stating that it is unable
to take a position with respect to the offer, together with the reasons for whichever of
these three alternatives is chosen.
108 City Code, supra note I, General Principle 7 & Rule 21.
109 Id. Rule 19.4.
1 10 Id. General Principle 7.
1 1 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Il1. 1969). See
Cohn, Demise of the Directors Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through
the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983).
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fer under the antitrust laws or alleging Williams Act violations, the
adoption of "poison pill" charter amendments, sale of highly desira-
ble "crown jewel" assets to a third party or giving a third party "lock-
up" rights to purchase in the event of an unfriendly takeover, repur-
chase of its own stock at a premium price, payment of a large divi-
dend, merger with a "white knight," and awarding "golden
parachute" contracts to management in the event of their dismissal
by a hostile offeror.
Rule 38 of the City Code, on the other hand, has been quite
successful in preventing this type of conduct from occurring in Brit-
ain. One study reported no use of obstructive defensive tactics by
management during a recent eighteen month survey period."12
Thus, although Rule 38 is not without its exceptions, it does seem to
limit management's freedom of action much more severely than does
the business judgment rule in the United States. Nonetheless, stud-
ies indicate that despite the confines of Rule 38, tender offers op-
posed by management succeed in a significantly lower percentage of
cases than do those which are supported or unopposed by incum-
bent management.' 13 This difference most likely stems from the fact
that Rule 38 does not prohibit management from opposing any offer
with a vigorous publicity campaign, which is likely to be given con-
siderable credence by the shareholders. Second, management is free
to encourage competing friendly offers which may have the effect of
defeating hostile offers. Third, Rule 38 does not prohibit pre-offer
tactics which may make unwelcome offers less likely to succeed.
The other side of the coin is that, even with the free hand given
management in the United States, once a company has come "into
play," i.e., has received an unwelcome bid, in most cases the odds
are that sooner or later, some action will result which will give the
target's shareholders an opportunity to reap a significant increase in
the value of the shares prior to the announcement of the bid.' 14
While this may consist of some action more to the liking of manage-
ment, such as "white knight" merger, repurchase of the corpora-
tion's shares, or leveraged buyout, it is undeniable that, from the
standpoint of the average shareholder it may be irrelevant whether
112 Danziger, Remedial Defensive Tactics Against Take-overs, 4 COMPANY LAW. 3 (1983).
113 One study of the effect of management opposition to tender offers indicated that,
in the two year period under study, only two per cent of unopposed takeover bids in the
United Kingdom failed while forty-four percent of those bids which were opposed by tar-
get corporations' management were unsuccessful. G. NEWBOULD, MANAGEMENT AND
MERGER ACTIVITY (1970). The study also showed that the final bid price in unopposed
bids was thirty-three percent above the pre-offer price of the target company's shares while
it was seventy-seven percent higher where management opposed the initial bid. Id.
114 Gilson, A Structural Approach to Coiporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Dities of Target
Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1980); Bebchuk, The Case for Facili-
tating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982).
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the initial hostile bid succeeds or whether some other transaction
takes place which is of equal or greater value to the shareholder than
the hostile offer. Furthermore, even those commentators who are
generally critical of management defensive tactics concede that in a
significant number of cases defensive tactics, by keeping the target
"in play" for a longer period of time, encourage higher competing
bids, and result in shareholders reaping a larger premium than they
would have received had they accepted the initial offeror's bid.' 15
Nonetheless, because management's defensive tactics do sub-
stantially thwart shareholder sovereignty they seem in principle to be
undesirable. It would appear to be possible to combine the best of
both the British and American systems by prohibiting obstructive
tactics on the part of management while, at the same time, encourag-
ing competing bids by lengthening the minimum time duration al-
lowable for a tender offer as well as the minimum proration
period.' 16 In this way, the shareholders' ultimate freedom of choice
would be preserved, while at the same time encouraging higher com-
peting bids for the target company's shares.
VI. Sanctions
Perhaps the most often named detriment of the British self-reg-
ulatory scheme is the problem of developing significant sanctions for
those found to have breached the City Code.' 17 Because the Panel
has no legal authority, it has no power to impose any sanctions
backed by the force of law itself, nor does it have the authority to
petition the court of law to impose any sanctions on a party breach-
ing the Code. In practice, then, the Panel's primary sanction is a
formal reprimand, either public or private, depending on the circum-
stances. Also, it may recommend to any professional association of
which the violator is a member that it discipline the individual in in-
stances where violation of the City Code would constitute unprofes-
sional action under the rules of that organization. Finally, the Panel
may recommend that the stock exchange cease trading in the shares
of any company found to have violated the Code." 18
In contrast, the SEC, being a federal administrative agency cre-
ated by Act of Congress, has express authority to enforce its orders
in a court of law or equity. Thus, in appropriate circumstances, the
115 Gilson, Seeking Comipetitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 51 (1982).
I 1(5 For an example of a legislative proposal along the lines recommended by the au-
thor, see Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 317 (1979).
117 P. DAVIES, TlE REGULATION OF TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 45 (1976); L. GOWER,
INVESTOR PROTECTION 36 (1982); Conimittee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions,
Report 314 (1980); B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 207
(1979).
1 I8 A. JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 151.
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SEC may seek and obtain injunctive relief, including orders to cease
and desist from conduct violating the Williams Act, orders to make
specific corrective disclosures in materials distributed to investors
under the Williams Act, and the like. These orders are, of course,
enforceable under the contempt power of the courts.' 19
Nonetheless, the differences in the enforcement powers of the
SEC and the Panel are probably less significant in practice than in
theory. Although the SEC has the authority to seek legal sanctions,
in practice finding an appropriate sanction to fit the offense may be
difficult, except when one is seeking prospective relief or corrective
disclosures during a tender offer. This problem was illustrated in
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Company 120 where the defendant was found
to have violated the Williams Act by inadvertently failing to report
that he had acquired more than five percent of the shares of the of-
feree corporation. 12 1 Although finding the defendant guilty of vio-
lating the Act, the Court refused to order him to divest himself of the
shares acquired or to enjoin him from voting the shares so ac-
quired. 122 The Court's majority opinion stressed the fact that the
violation was not willful and that defendant had promptly filed the
appropriate disclosure statement under section 13(e) when informed
of his breach.' 2 3 A vigorous dissent criticized the majority, arguing
that it had effectively emasculated the reporting requirements of the
Williams Act by denying any meaningful remedy unless plaintiff
could show that it had been prejudiced by the violation, a showing
that would be extremely difficult to make in most situations. 124 The
common remedy for disclosure violations, i.e., the issuance of an in-
junction prohibiting defendant from engaging in similar violations in
the future, is essentially meaningless since most takeover bids are
one-shot transactions.
While the significance of the legal enforcement powers of the
SEC may easily be overemphasized, the powers of moral suasion ex-
ercised by the Panel over the years have probably been more effec-
tive than its critics generally admit. The Panel encourages
negotiation between itself, the offeror, and, wherever possible, the
offeree concerning the conduct of the offer. This format, together
with the disclosure statements filed with the shareholders, has gener-
ally worked effectively in providing meaningful information to the
shareholders without the need for litigation. Also, the tight-knit na-
ture of the City of London financial community has had the effect of
119 Williams Act, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS, supra note 99, at 109-13.
12o 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
121 Id. at 57.
122 Id. at 65.
123 Id. at 60.
124 Id. at 66.
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rendering the moral sanctions and reprimands quite effective in de-
terring conduct violating the City Code by those for whom the main-
tenance of an impeccable reputation in the City is essential to their
livelihood. This is vividly illustrated by the Jim Rapier case, in which
a financier who initially refused to abide by the Panel's sanctions re-
cently relented and advised the Panel that he would honor its wishes
after discovering that the smirch on his reputation resulting from the
Panel's sanctions had seriously impaired his ability to do business in
the City.1 2 5
It is undeniable, though, that a number of cases have occurred
in which the Panel was not able to deal satisfactorily with the offend-
ers. 126 The fact that the Panel has had to depend in many instances
on the action of a third party, i.e., the stock exchange or a profes-
sional association, means that it has no direct control over the sanc-
tion invoked; such a body may take a different view of the severity of
the member's offense and therefore refuse to enforce the Panel's rec-
ommended sanction if it feels that it was too severe. Also, the sanc-
tions available to those bodies may be inappropriate to cover the
nature of the offense involved as, for example, where restitution of
money to injured shareholders would be the most appropriate sanc-
tion, but one which the professional association has no power to de-
cree. 127 In one instance, that of insider trading, the Panel itself
recognized the need for legal enforcement mechanisms and recom-
mended amendment of the Companies Act of 1980 to accomplish
this end. 12 8
The situation with respect to private rights of action is also one
125 The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March, 1981,
at 4; Financial Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
126 One of the most controversial incidents involving the Panel in recent years in-
volved the takeover bid in August 1985 by the Burton Group PLC for Debenhams PLC, a
British department store chain. A number of irregularities occurred in the course of the
bid including last minute changes in the terms of the offer, and a last minute extension of
the closing date of the offer when it appeared that the requisite number of shares had not
been tendered. This was followed by the tendering of a sufficient number of shares to
satisfy the terms of the offer and cause it to be declared unconditional. There were allega-
tions, which were never proven, that short tendering had taken place (an action illegal
under the Code) in amounts sufficient to affect the success of the offer. The Panel, how-
ever, was unable to uncover any proof of these allegations and ultimately gave the offer a
clean bill of health. The incident has been cited by some as indicating that, in the increas-
ingly cut-throat atmosphere prevailing in the City financial community, the Panel lacks
sufficient resources and authority to cope successfully with the growing wave of hostile
takeovers. See Morse, The Burton/Debenhams Affair, Frustrating Actions, Closing of the Offer. and
Short Selling, 1985 J. Bus. L. 480; The Times (London), Aug. 11, 1985, at 48, col. 1.
127 Takeover bids by parties residing overseas with no local connection with the City
financial community are an example. See The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Report
on the Year ended 31 March, 1981, at 4 (discussing the "St. Piran affair"); Lazarides,
Acquiring Companies: Problems of Ownership and Control, 4 COMPANY LAW. 66 (1983) (discuss-
ing the DeBeers case as an example of the inability of the Panel to satisfactorily deal with
the phenomenon of "dawn raids" prior to the adoption of the Rules Governing Substan-
tial Acquisitions of Shares).
128 Rider, Self-Regulation, The British Approach to Policing Conduct in the Securities Business.
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in which an American shareholder is much more favorably situated.
U.S. courts have found that implied private rights of action exist
under the Williams Act in favor of, for example, the target share-
holders against the target 1 29 by the target corporation itself, against
the offeror and by the offeror against the target corporation. 30
While injunctive relief is most commonly awarded, a money damage
remedy is available in appropriate instances as well. Similarly, a pri-
vate cause of action may also exist for violations of the state corpo-
rate codes of either the offeror or the target, as well as a common law
action for breach of fiduciary duty.' 3 1
In Britain, by contrast, little private litigation arises out of the
takeover process. A number of factors may explain this striking ab-
sence of litigation. First, the fact that the City Code is a voluntary
code of self-regulation means that its breach does not create a cause
of action in favor of anyone. 132 Indeed, the Panel itself has indicated
that it does not welcome the use of the courts as a means of defeating
takeover bids and has stated that it should be consulted prior to insti-
tuting judicial action. At the same time, however, the Panel has rec-
ognized that directors might be in violation of their fiduciary duty to
shareholders if they failed to seek judicial redress of clear-cut viola-
tions of law which injured their company, and in such instances the
Panel could not and would not stand in their way.' 33
Second, British common law dealing with the protection of mi-
nority shareholders is more limited than that in the United States.
The shareholder derivative suit is available only in limited circum-
stances since, under the doctrine of Foss v. Harbottle, it is unavailable
if the matter complained of could be remedied by a majority vote of
the shareholders.' 3 4 While there has been some increasing recogni-
tion of minority shareholder rights in Britain the situation is still a far
cry from that in the United States.' 3 5 The prohibition of contingent
with Particular Reference to the Role of the City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers in the Regulation of
Insider Trading, IJ. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 319, 335 (1978).
129 Eg., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
130 Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
131 Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
132 The Panel itself is not entitled to injunctive relief to enforce provisions of the City
Code. P. DAVIES, supra note 117, at 43. In addition, the courts have looked with disfavor
on private parties seeking injunctive relief for violations of the City Code and have indi-
cated that even the act of seeking injunctive relief by a target could be considered a viola-
tion of General Principle 4 of the City Code since it constitutes action designed to frustrate
a takeover bid. See Dunford & Eyloitt Ltd. v. Johnson and Firth Brown, Ltd., I Lloyd's
Rep. 505 (1977),
133 M. WEINBERG, M. BLANK & A. GREYSTOKE, WEINBERG AND BLANK ON TAKE-OVERS
AND MERGERS 617-18 (4th ed. 1979).
1'4 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843). See DeMott, supra note 38, at 993.
135 See GOWER'S PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at 675-79.
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fees and the rule imposing liability for attorney fees on the losing
party undoubtedly also serve to discourage shareholder litigation.
Other substantive shortcomings exist as well. Although the Brit-
ish antitrust laws apply to mergers which would have anticompetitive
consequences, they cannot be enforced by private parties.' 36 Thus,
an antitrust challenge to a merger, common in the United States,
cannot be instituted by the target or one of its shareholders in a de-
rivative action in Britain. Only the Department of Trade has this
authority, and, while management or the shareholders may bring a
potentially anticompetitive takeover to the attention of the Monopo-
lies and Mergers Commission of the Department of Trade, private
litigants are powerless to force it to act. 137 Furthermore, if the
tender offer itself is lucrative, enough, financially interested share-
holders cannot be relied upon to initiate official action, regardless of
the takeover company's antitrust violations. In fact, the reference of
such matters to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission is not re-
sorted to as frequently as one might expect, given that such a move
can effectively delay the consummation of a takeover, if not lead to
its abandonment. Finally, the close socio-economic ties within the
City financial community and British industry and the absence of a
history of litigation in the corporate area are significant, if intangible,
factors that contribute to the absence of litigation as well.
Nonetheless, when all is said and done, it is difficult to assess the
significance of this factor in weighing the relative success or failure of
the self-regulatory scheme in Britain. If the infrequency of litigation
is interpreted to mean that the City Code and the Panel have been
successful in preventing those abuses for which shareholders regu-
larly seek redress in the courts in the United States, then it is clearly
a plus for self-regulation. However, if the lack of litigation results
from the procedural obstacles to redress as well as from the lack of
strong substantive legal protection available to shareholders, then
there may be a substantial number of shareholders who have what
would under U.S. law be recognized as legitimate grievances but who
are unable to obtain satisfactory resolution of those grievances. If
this is the case it marks a serious deficiency in the British scheme.
Although the Panel has occasionally succeeded in obtaining mone-
136 See generally Wasserstein, British Merger Policy from an American Perspective, 82 YALE LJ.
656 (1973).
137 In the past few years, some target companies have successfully persuaded the Mo-
nopolies and Mergers Commission to block unwanted bidders for quasi-political or nation-
alistic reasons. Takeover bids for other banks by the Royal Bank of Scotland were blocked
because the Commission decided that Scotland needed Scottish-controlled companies. In
1983, the Commission investigated several bids for Sotheby Parke Bernet, the famous art
auctioneer, as the target attempted (unsuccessfully, in the end) to persuade it that
Sotheby's was a national treasure of Britain which should not be allowed to fall into Ameri-
can hands. See Wall St. Journal, Dec. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 1.
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tary redress for individuals who have suffered harm from a violation
of the City Code, this event has not occurred frequently.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
An examination of the British regulatory system in light of the
most frequently made criticisms of the U.S. system leads the author
to the following conclusions:
(1) The City Code is significantly more protective of the small
shareholder of a corporation which is the target of a tender offer
than is its U.S. counterpart. This greater solicitude is largely due to
three facts. First, the City Code discourages partial offers. Second,
the City Code requires that subsequent purchases by the offeror fol-
lowing a partial acquisition must be at a price at least as high as the
highest price paid by the offeror during the preceding twelve
months. This limitation effectively removes the incentive for the of-
feror to make a "two-tier offer" such as has often been used in the
United States. Third, the City Code's prohibition on obstructive de-
fensive tactics effectively prevents management of a target from em-
ploying many of the tactics used in the United States to defeat or
delay an unwanted offer. In most situations, this is to the target
shareholder's advantage, although it can be argued that, in a few
cases, defensive tactics have resulted in the target shareholders even-
tually receiving a better offer from a second bidder, or a higher offer
on a negotiated basis, from the first bidder than would otherwise
have occurred.
On the other hand, neither country's regulatory system deals ef-
fectively with the problem of anticipatory defensive measures taken
prior to the announcement of a tender offer, such as "poison pills"
and other "shark repellant" amendments, defensive mergers, and
the like. Furthermore, recent judicial and regulatory developments
in the United States, such as the SEC regulations prohibiting selec-
tive repurchases by a target of its shares, the decision in Revlon v.
Pantry Pride,'38 which effectively forces management to remain im-
partial and not favor one bidder over another, and Smith v. Van
Gorkom,13 9 which effectively limits the scope of the business judg-
ment rule in protecting management from liability in a tender offer
context, bring the state of the law in the United States closer to the
norms imposed by the City Code. These cases indicate that the judi-
cial and legislative systems may be becoming more sensitive to the
need to protect shareholders from their own management as well as
from a hostile raider.
(2) The City Code is not only more solicitous of the interests
of small shareholders than is the Williams Act, but it applies to a
13' 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
13) 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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potentially broader variety of takeover activity as well. The lack of
any strict statutory definition of "takeover" makes it theoretically
more difficult for offerors to avoid the jurisdiction of the City Panel
by a novel structuring of the takeover bid. Under the City Code what
is important is the determination whether, in fact, control of a large
corporation will pass from one group of shareholders to another
rather than how the transfer in shareholdings will be effectuated.
Consequently, even gradual open market purchases of large
amounts of stock would bring the purchaser within the jurisdiction of
the City Panel while this would not be true under the Williams Act.
Notwithstanding the above, however, it would appear that the City
Panel has been somewhat more reluctant than necessary to extend its
jurisdiction to cover new types of activities without prior notice to
market participants. Thus, the fact that the City Code gives the
Panel the authority to assert jurisdiction over acts which are covered
by the spirit of the Code although not expressly within its letter, is
less significant in practice than might first appear.
(3) Several aspects of the British system appear to cause less
litigation to be instituted in connection with tender offers than is
generally the case in the United States. Since the City Code is a vol-
untary code of self-regulation, actions for violation of it are brought
to the Panel's attention as opposed to winding up in court as is true
of Williams Act violations. Furthermore, the prohibition of defen-
sive tactics by the target corporation discourages the use of litigation
as a defense mechanism. Also, the fact that antitrust violations do
not create a private right of action in the United Kingdom means that
this cause of action is simply unavailable. Whether this absence of
litigation is on the whole positive, however, is difficult to assess. If it
means that the British are able to resolve disputes between the inter-
ested parties to a hostile takeover satisfactorily in a nonadversarial
manner, then this is a mark of the system's success. On the other
hand, if the absence of litigation is a result of the lack of appropriate
legal remedies for minority shareholders and target corporations 'so
that important rights remain unvindicated, then the absence of litiga-
tion is not the benefit that it first appears to be.
(4) Finally, although much has been made over the self-regula-
tory nature of the British system vis-a-vis the legal regulatory scheme
in the United States, this distinction is not critical when comparing
the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. First, the most
advantageous features of the British scheme are not inherent in a
self-regulatory system but could be accommodated within the U.S.
scheme as well. Thus, certain substantive features of the City Code
discussed previously, such as its prohibition on defensive tactics and
severe treatment of partial offers, could easily be accommodated
within the framework of the Williams Act or SEC regulations
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promulgated thereunder. Similarly, the flexibility the Panel has in
deciding whether to invoke its jurisdiction over a transaction which
has most, but not all, of the characteristics of a tender offer could be
largely given to the SEC merely by issuing expansive regulations
which broadly define the term "tender offer" as it appears in the Wil-
liams Act.
Second, those features of self-regulation that are not easily ac-
commodated within a legal regulatory scheme do not seem terribly
significant when compared with the most criticized features of the
present U.S. scheme of regulation. A 1974 Department of Trade
survey listed the main advantages of self-regulation to be the follow-
ing: flexibility in interpreting the City Code; ability to deal with the
spirit as well as the letter of the, law; speed of response; development
of expertise in dealing with the area being regulated; and its relative
low cost. 14 1 None of these factors loom large in the criticism of the
current regulation of tender offers by the SEC and the courts.
In short, then, the mere fact that the British scheme is self-regu-
latory in nature should not deter either the SEC or Congress from
attempting to incorporate its most desirable features. Indeed, in
Britain, the City Panel itself, is now being cloaked with legal author-
ity by bringing it under the umbrella of the new Securities and In-
vestments Board, thereby giving it quasi-legal status.
140 See Gower, supra note 63, at 53. On January 28, 1987, the Secretary of State's
Office announced that it would commence a review of the regulation of takeovers in Brit-
ain. On May Ii, 1987, the Secretary announced that the review had been completed and
that measures would be recommended which would improve the monitoring and investi-
gative capabilities of the Take-over Panel, adding further to the arrangements already
made by the Panel with the London Stock Exchange to use the Exchange's new informa-
tion systems. The measures are also expected to make available to the Panel the sanctions
of the Securities and Investments Board and recognized self-regulating organizations.
They will also require authorized investment businesses to cooperate with the Panel's in-
vestigations. Detailed amendments implementing these recommendations are expected to
be formally proposed late in 1987. Letter from Peter Frazer, Deputy Director-General of
the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers to the author (July 13, 1987) (available from author).
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